【国关青少年说】魏建勋:中夏族民共和国与北印度洋公约组织-怎么着相互同盟?

Chinese officials and analysts regard the US pivot towards the
Asia-Pacific as a strategy to contain China, despite Washington’s claim
that it does not focus on a particular country. Instead of accepting
either Chinese skepticism or US official statements at face value, this
article attempts to trace the origins and examine the evolution of the
pivot through the lens of the Pentagon’s internal think tank, the Office
of Net Assessment .Drawing on documents produced and sponsored by the
office, this article explores trends in its analysis of Asian security
and Sino-American relations, the rationale for the pivot and China’s
role in the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategy.Established in 1973,
the ONA is directed by Andrew W. Marshall and employs around 15 staff.1
Most of its projects are outsourced to external academics, think tanks
and companies. The US Department of Defense defines net assessment as
‘the comparative analysis of military, technological, political,
economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability
of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that
deserve the attention of senior defense officials.’2 The ONA studies
issues relevant to national security such as weapons technology and
climate change, explores worst-case scenarios and promotes no-regret
strategies. 3 Using methods such as war games, simulations, policy
analysis and scenario-based planning, the office aims to anticipate
strategic developments 20 years in advance.Marshall was described by
former US Vice President Dick Cheney as one of the world’s best
strategists, and last year was ranked at number 44 in Foreign Policy’s
Top 100 Global Thinkers.4 Like many first-generation RAND scholars,
Marshall is often praised for his originality, though he has also been
criticised for making exaggerated claims.This article is based on the
study of ONA-related defence department documents and memoranda, the
writings of officials and experts associated with the office and work by
individuals and organisations it commissioned to carry out research. For
brevity, I will not specify every aspect of the ONA’s relationship with
the individuals and organisations quoted in this article. Generally,
these sources influenced, or were influenced by, Marshall and the ONA.
Those associated with the ONA will usually be referred to as net
assessors. Although Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years
1994–1999 seemingly has no connection to the office, Marshall and Albert
Wohlstetter were consulted on the drafting of the document.5 Zalmay
Khalilzad and Abram N. Shulsky, major authors of the guidance, both have
a background at RAND and are closely associated with Marshall and
Wohlstetter. Shulsky also worked for the ONA, and was one of the
participants in its 1999 Summer Study. This article examines ONA-related
work since the 1980s.I recognise the limitations of this approach.
Firstly, there is no discussion of the degree to which US
national-security policy has in fact been influenced by the office and
the studies it sponsored. Secondly, some may categorise the ONA and its
associated net assessors as neoconservatives, and argue that my sources
reveal only certain neoconservative perspectives. However, instead of
discussing ideology, this study treats the office as a channel through
which experts from academic, non-governmental institutions influence
national-security decision-making at the highest level. The underlying
assumption is that examining ONA-related work will help us understand
the world views of senior US officials and defence elites or, at least,
tell us what interests the Pentagon’s internal think tank and, to some
extent, the Defense Department. There is also an assumption that it will
tell us what questions they asked at certain points in time and reveal,
to a degree, the rationale for the pivot. In any case, if US officials
and elites’ views of the security environment and the pivot are to be
assessed, ONArelated work appears a good place to begin.Cold War
origins
As shown by various high-level strategy and national-security
documents, the ONA’s work during the Cold War led to net assessment
becoming the United States’ main analytical framework for understanding
the global security environment and the competition with the USSR. The
White House’s 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States
argued thatthe United States must pursue strategies for competition
with the Soviets which emphasize our comparative advantages …
Competitive strategies are aimed at exploiting our technological
advantages in thoughtful and systematic ways to cause the Soviets to
compete less efficiently or less effectively in areas of military
application. Such strategies seek to make portions of the tremendous
Soviet military machine obsolete and force the Soviets to divert
resources in ways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may not
necessarily threaten our own forces.6
Some scholars and former officials
argued that the ONA, alongside the Competitive Strategies Initiative
created by Marshall, helped to perfect the containment strategy that
contributed to the collapse of the USSR.7 As argued by Daniel I. Gouré,
vice-president of the Lexington Institute, ‘the competitive strategies
approach, particularly as applied by the Reagan administration, did much
to set the stage for subsequent events and for the eventual collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact’.8The ONA continues to play an
influential role in strategic assessment and defence planning. It is
responsible for preparing the US defence secretary’s annual report to
Congress, which contains a comprehensive net assessment ‘to determine
the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies
as compared with those of their potential adversaries’.9 The ONA’s work
on the well-known concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs has
influenced strategists in many countries. The office is often involved
in drafting and assessing national-security and defence-policy
documents.Many former ONA staff have held high-ranking positions at the
Pentagon, think tanks, consulting companies, universities or military
education centres. Taiwan and India have established their own offices
of net assessment and the approach has heavily influenced Australian
defence policy. According to Chen Zhou, the main author of four recent
Chinese defence white papers, the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of
Military Science also studies Marshall’s work.10From its inception to
around 2000, the ONA went through roughly three phases in assessing the
global security environment and identifying potential challenges.
Firstly, during the Cold War, it focused on long-term competition with
the USSR. Secondly, in the aftermath of the Cold War, it worked to find
the right direction for strategic orientation. Finally, from the
mid-1990s to around 2000, the office began to fully realise the
strategic importance of Asia and assess potential great-power
competitors in the region. At the end of this phase, the office
concluded that China would be the United States’ main strategic
competitor in the next few decades.During the ONA’s first phase of
assessment, Asia was treated as a key balance area but regarded as being
much less important than Europe. China appeared in its studies only on
occasion and, when it did, was viewed in terms of its importance to
competition with the USSR.11 In the mid-1980s, the ONA recognised that
Asia was becoming more important. Drawing on a 1983 strategic-balance
review, Marshall concluded that the United States was in a strong
position and the Soviets’ capacity to wage global war was diminishing.12
This allowed the ONA to divert some of its resources to studying future
security scenarios, such as the rise of Asia and the development of a
multipolar world order. Consequently, in 1985 the office requested that
the Science Applications International Corporation begin to study
potential strategies and policies for use in such scenarios.13 The main
findings of these studies were reflected in The Future Security
Environment, a 1988 report by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term
Strategy, led by Marshall and Charles Wolf, Jr, professor at the Pardee
RAND Graduate School. This report accurately identified several
long-term trends, two of which are still highly relevant to the United
States’ current strategic thinking and pivot towards Asia.Firstly, the
paper argued that the Soviets were correct in thinking technological
development would lead to new forms of military organization and
operational concepts that would fundamentally change the nature of
warfare. Secondly, Marshall and Wolf predicted that the rapid economic
growth of East Asian countries would increase their military spending,
shifting the balance of power in a way that could affect US security.14
Although the USSR was still at the centre of ONA studies and US
strategic planning at the time, the report noted that a multipolar world
order was emerging and Asia was becoming increasingly important. The
ONA’s recognition of such changes is also evident in subsequent studies,
such as Multipolarity in the Pacific by 2010: A Geopolitical Simulation
and An Examination of the Implications of Multi-Polarity in Strategy and
Force Structure.15Redefining strategic objectivesAlthough the ONA
recognised the emergence of a multipolar world order in the 1980s, it
was the great changes caused by the end of the Cold War that led it to
drastically reassess prevailing ideas about national interests and
strategies. Soon after the collapse of the USSR, net assessors
acknowledged that the United States was not directly threatened and no
longer had a peer competitor. As a 1994 ONA-sponsored study pointed out,
‘current U.S. statements of objectives and strategy are either overly
specific or vague because they are in transition from the well-defined
problems of the Cold War to a new, relatively undefined set of
problems’.16 According to the 1993–99 US National Security Surveys, ‘a
primary characteristic of the Cold War was that it really was very
stable … It provided a beacon for orientation. There is no beacon right
now.’17The ONA’s search for such a beacon led to the redefined strategic
objectives and conception of global security proposed in Defense
Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999. Written by, among
others, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, later Cheney’s chief of staff, under the
supervision of future US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the
document discussed the United States’ new position as the world’s only
superpower. It also reviewed other nations’ capacity to develop
strategic aims and defence postures to challenge this status. The plan
clearly defined new strategic objectives as preventing ‘the re-emergence
of a new rival for world power’ and addressing ‘sources of regional
conflict and instability’ that could unsettle international relations by
threatening the interests of the United States or its allies.18Despite
its aims, the study neither identified the United States’ regional focus
nor its potential rivals. It suggested that the main US objective in
Asia was ‘to continue to contribute to regional security and stability
by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a
regional hegemon’.19 While it supported European integration, a Europe
that excluded the United States was judged to be unacceptable. The study
also presented India as a potential regional hegemon, recommending that
the United States ‘discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the
other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean’.20The ONA worked to
identify potential threats and adversaries throughout the early 1990s
but there is no evidence that it focused on a specific region or
adversary until the middle of the decade. In 1992 Marshall instructed
his military assistant Andrew F. Krepinevich to assess other nations’
potential to initiate an RMA. Krepinevich compared the global security
environment of the time with that of the early 1920s in the belief that
no major enemy had emerged. His report intended to identify the most
important actors in the following two decades but concluded that the
most capable potential rivals were US allies, who had no strong
incentive to compete. (Russia had an incentive to compete but was in no
position to do so.)ONA-sponsored studies conducted in the mid-1990s such
as Research Design for Asia Force Assessment and Asian Security
Challenges: Planning in the Face of Strategic Uncertainties revealed
Asia’s enormous strategic and economic significance. Unlike The Future
Security Environment, which suggested the region’s relative importance
would moderately increase, these studies argued that it would become
more important than Europe in subsequent decades. From 1993–98, the ONA
conducted various RMA-oriented war games, workshops, roundtables and
seminars. East Asia dominated its regional studies. Among the 13 papers
the office produced in this period, three focused on China, six on
Korean unification and one on wider Asia.21 Asia 2025, which was
published in 1999, succinctly explained the reason for this change:
‘most US military assets are in Europe, where there are no foreseeable
conflicts threatening vital US interests. The threats are in
Asia.’22Peer competitorsThe ONA’s advocacy of a shift of attention
from Europe to Asia was based on the assumption that a peer competitor
to the United States would eventually emerge from the East.23 Asian
Security Challenges envisioned four distinct versions of the future
security environment in the region, including a scenario in which ‘the
major challenge to U.S. security interests came from the regional
hegemonic ambitions of one or more large Asian states: China, Russia,
Japan or India.’24During the latter half of the decade, the ONA
conducted many in-depth assessments of these countries to identify which
was most likely to become a peer competitor. It analysed their strategic
objectives, wider aims, willingness to challenge US supremacy and
long-term trends in economics, demography and military capability. It
also undertook various projects to assess the future balance of power in
Asia by comparing Asian countries’ efforts and abilities to create and
adapt to new military technologies.25 Marshall was one of the few
defence analysts to recognise China’s economic potential in the 1980s:
he predicted the country would develop the world’s largest economy in
25–30 years. In 1994 Marshall argued that ‘there may be six or eight
major powers, but the two that have the biggest chance of becoming major
competitors are a revived Russia that partially reconstructs its empire,
and China.’26 Marshall’s net assessors did continue to study other
scenarios. This was in line with his oft-repeated lesson to ONA staff:
‘don’t try to make your best guess. Don’t try to say, this is what’s
going to happen, I’m pretty sure, and then suppress dissent, suppress
other scenarios that might unfold, or imply that you sort of have a
know-it-all attitude.’27In the early 1990s, for example, many net
assessors judged that Japan’s economic power and technological
development made it a promising candidate to initiate a future RMA and
challenge the United States. Asian Security Challenges argued
thatJapan’s technology, manufacturing capabilities, manpower skills,
communications, and transportation nets would enable it to make a major
increase in its military capabilities, if it decided to do so and was
able to overcome the domestic political barriers to becoming a military
power … Japan has the resources to become the dominant military power
in Asia and even to become a global military power.28The 1991 study
Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy
points out that ‘Asian leaders – notably in Japan – resented the notion
that American leaders would arrogate to themselves the right to make
decisions and take actions in the name of the greater good of a broadly
defined Western world (including the advanced economies of Asia)’.29
However, Japan’s Potential Role in a Military-Technical Revolution,
published later that year, concluded that the country showed no interest
in re-militarisation: ‘Two strong impressions came out of interviews.
First, the pacifist sentiment in Japan was even stronger than we had
imagined from our previous readings and experience. Second,
tactical-technical innovation is weak and, as far as we could discover,
almost non-existent.’30 Moreover, the stagnation of the Japanese economy
made it unlikely that Japan would become a peer competitor.During this
period, net assessors maintained that Russia’s military capability,
notwithstanding formidable weapons systems and advanced technological
expertise, was being severely eroded by economic difficulties and a
demographic crisis. Moscow’s defence budget was rapidly diminishing; the
Russian state had ‘consistently had problems meeting budget commitments
due to tax shortfalls’. The country’s negative population growth had
reduced its military-age population.31 This demographic crisis was
serious enough that, from the mid-1990s, net assessors grew concerned
that China might exploit it by populating Russia’s eastern territories
or invading Siberia.32 They also argued that Russia’s sophisticated
research and development infrastructure would be undercut by long-term
economic decline.The ONA identified China rather than India as the
United States’ principle adversary for several reasons. Firstly, it
seems net assessors could not agree whether India should be considered
as a potential niche competitor or peer competitor.33 The key difference
between these categories is that niche competitors do not threaten the
United States’ vital interests, while peer competitors have the
potential to challenge its global dominance. Secondly, even if both
countries were considered to be potential peer competitors, China would
rise more quickly in the short term. Published in 1996, the ONAsponsored
study China and India, 2025: A Comparative Assessment concluded that
China had more potential for growth before 2025, but India was likely to
become more powerful thereafter.34 One scenario explored in Asia 2025
suggested that the United States needed to establish ‘a working
strategic dialogue and common geopolitical objectives with one of them,
and India appears to be the more logical choice’.35 In April 2000,
Marshall suggested this strategy to Donald Rumsfeld, who would be
appointed US defence secretary in January 2001, arguing that the United
States needed to ‘get interested in India and Australia, and develop
better relationships’.36 Marshall confirmed his support for this
approach in a discussion about the creation of an Asian equivalent to
NATO with high-level Indian civilian advisers in 2003.37China as the
principle competitor
The ONA judged China to be the United States’ main
competitor by assessing its capabilities and intentions, which it
continues to carefully monitor. A large population with a relatively
high literacy rate provides China with the skilled labour necessary for
military modernisation and an RMA. The percentage of China’s population
at working age will be higher than that of India until 2030, when the
trend reverses.38 Marshall started thinking about China as a potential
threat to American primacy when its economy, which has been growing
rapidly since 1978, was smaller than that of Italy. He suggested that
its rapid economic expansion would allow it to increase its military
capability and diplomatic influence in Asia and other regions, such as
Africa and Latin America.China’s military is larger, and being
modernised more quickly, than that of any other Asian country. The
Americans feared that its growing anti-access and area-denial
capabilities would enable it to coerce its neighbours and gradually
displace US influence in the region. In the mid-1990s, China’s economic
development allowed it to significantly increase defence spending and
modernisation programmes, and to initiate an RMA. Since then, Marshall
has commissioned studies on the country’s military development,
power-projection capabilities, changes to its operational doctrine,
perception of the future security environment, approach to warfare and
RMA.39 In the 1994 China in the Near Term, net assessors contended that
the 1991 US invasion of Iraq in Operation Desert Storm fundamentally
altered Chinese perceptions of future warfare and fuelled the PLA’s
modernisation efforts.40 In 2005 the late Mary C. FitzGerald, research
fellow at the Hudson Institute, warned that China had moved towards an
RMA by developing weaponry and improving its military theory,
organisation, education and training.41She argued thatinformation, naval
and, above all, aerospace [capabilities] still constitute the nucleus
of the new revolution in military affairs. If we neglect the timely
development of weaponry in these arenas, then China could catch America
like a deer in the proverbial headlights, precisely where we caught them
after the 1991 victory in Desert Storm.42During the 1990s, the balance
of military power in the Asia-Pacific gradually shifted to benefit
China. The collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation considerably eased Sino-Russian territorial
disputes and allowed China to focus on other contended areas, such as
the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In
response to the PLA’s demonstration of force in the 1995–96 Taiwan
Strait crisis, the United States assisted Taiwan by providing it with
analytical training through the ONA and helping it to develop its
defence capabilities.43In 2000 Marshall argued that ‘the PRC is
ambitious. Its goal is to be a great power.’44 Such a view was also
evident in China in the Near Term, which concluded that China’s
long-term strategic goal was to develop a military that rivalled the
United States globally.45 The report argued that China was dissatisfied
with the US-dominated world order and its foreign policies were
‘independent of and sometimes opposed to U.S. policies’, which created
‘the potential for China directly to challenge U.S. security
interests’.46 The Pentagon-sponsored The United States and a Rising
China: Strategic and Military Implications, published in 1999, used
realist theory and an analysis of Chinese history to argue that China
would seek to dominate the Asia-Pacific as its power grew.47 As
FitzGerald put it in 2005, ‘China’s ultimate objective is to achieve
global military-economic dominance by 2050’.48Marshall laid out the
blueprint for the pivot in a memo to Rumsfeld in May 2002:Australia:
start negotiations to base selected US forces in Australian Northern
Territories and expand US and regional states’ use of Australian
training ranges … India: increase port visits, and initiate program of
mil-to-mil interactions; initiate joint planning for contingency of loss
of control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan … Initiate planning for a
major expansion of basing infrastructure in Guam, and possible
improvement in Pearl Harbor infrastructure … Direct the Services to plan
for the types of military challenges a malevolent China may pose over
the long-term, and incorporate these into Service and Joint war games,
training and exercise programs, including routine wide-area
USN–USAF–special forces exercises … For next UCP change , redraw
CENTCOM/PACOM boundaries to reflect China as principle long-term
strategic competitor.49The memo makes clear that despite China’s
comparative lack of development in many areas, the ONA had identified it
as the biggest threat to US primacy over the next few decades. As Aaron
L. Friedberg, professor at Princeton University, has argued, ‘China
today appears to have both the “will” and the “wallet” to compete
actively with the United States for power and influence, not only in
Asia, but around the world’.50Preserving US primacy through
competition with China
Net assessors usually suggest that the United
States has three ways to meet the challenges of a rising China.51 It
could either forego its current primacy by reducing its global presence
and reverting to isolationism, create a multipolar world order in which
other great powers take the lead in dealing with problems in their
regions or preserve its current position by limiting China’s growing
power and influence.52Several ONA studies in the early 2000s addressed
the difficulties of preserving or extending US primacy.53 Although net
assessors acknowledge that the United States’ relative power will
decline in coming decades, they often argue that it can preserve its
current role. In the face of challenges from emerging powers, history
suggests that a dominant state can preserve or strengthen its primacy.
Friedberg has argued that the United States may be able to maintain its
position for at least a few decades.54 The 2002 ONA paper Military
Advantage in History uses case studies of dominant ancient powers to
argue that superior armed forces are vital to the preservation of great
power status:The Roman model suggests that it is possible for the United
States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains
capable of transforming its forces before an opponent can develop
countercapabilities. Transformation coupled with strong strategic
institutions is a powerful combination for an adversary to
overcome.55The paper therefore suggests that the United States needed to
initiate an RMA to adapt to the changing security environment,
especially the asymmetric challenges posed by China.Having confirmed
that maintaining US primacy was possible, Marshall devised a strategy
for competing with China that focused on dissuasion, deterrence and
defeat. This approach was officially introduced in the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report and reiterated in later documents. The strategy
accords with Marshall’s view that ‘any adequate balance assessment
requires evaluation from at least three perspectives: deterrence, likely
war outcomes, and long-term competition in peacetime’.56Dissuasion,
deterrence and defeat
Net assessors argue that dissuasion is crucial to
long-term peacetime competition. Marshall suggests the United States’
strategic goal ‘should be to delay the emergence of hostile and
competent competitors’.57 This objective could be achieved by dissuading
China from further developing its military or expanding globally. The
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report proposed thatthrough its strategy
and actions, the United States influences the nature of future military
competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates
military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well targeted
strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from
initiating future military competitions.58Although the concept of
dissuasion was only officially introduced in 2001, the ONA has studied
the idea for much longer. In 1992 Krepinevich stated ‘there are ways in
which the United States could shape the competition, or dissuade or
deter competitors’.59 Today, dissuasion and deterrence appear to be very
similar. Dissuasion Strategy, a 2008 study by the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, defined dissuasion as ‘pre-deterrence’ or
‘actions taken to increase the target’s perception of the anticipated
costs and/or decrease its perception of the likely benefits from
developing, expanding, or transferring a military capability that would
be threatening or otherwise undesirable from the US perspective’.60
Stephen P. Rosen, professor at Harvard University, has explained the
logic of long-term peaceful competition:By understanding the fears and
sensitivities of an adversary, programs could be initiated or reinforced
in ways that reduced the confidence of the adversary in his ability to
win an engagement or a war. This could enhance deterrence, and also lead
the adversary to cease its efforts even to compete with the United
States in certain areas.61The United States may dissuade potential
competitors by occasionally demonstrating its military capabilities and
willingness to enter into a conflict, but dissuasion is a very delicate
matter. An excessive demonstration of force and willingness to fight
could prompt greater Chinese assertiveness。This suggests that to
determine the correct use of the strategy, the Pentagon will closely
monitor China’s perception of, and responses to, dissuasive action. The
success of such a strategy depends more on the Chinese reaction to
dissuasive demonstrations of power than the actual capabilities of US
forces. Where China’s view of US military superiority has made it less
likely to develop capabilities to challenge the United States,
dissuasion has succeeded. This recognition of the importance of
perceptions has led to many studies of human cognition, the biological
mechanisms of decision-making and Chinese culture, strategic traditions
and leadership ideology.62In the last 10–15 years, the ONA has focused
on strategic dissuasion. The office views China’s development of
capabilities as being in its early stages, but having great potential to
challenge US primacy in the long term. The ONA also concludes that,
should both dissuasion and deterrence fail, the United States must be
prepared to defeat China. The likely outcomes of such a conflict, and
whether it would serve US interests in the long term, are unclear. The
ONA’s usual method of gathering experts from relevant areas to create a
range of plausible scenarios is insufficient for predicting how a war
between the United States and China would play out, even in terms of
assessing the likelihood of achieving military objectives. Qualitative
factors, such as doctrine and operational concepts, are vital to
determining the results of such a war. The development of new weapons
technologies and operational concepts could serve the strategies of
dissuasion, deterrence and defeat because it may enable the United
States to prevail in future conflicts and discourage potential
adversaries from attacking US interests.63Assessing ChinaSince 2000,
the ONA appears to have made significant progress in creating strategies
for long-term competition with China. As the office increased its
efforts to understand the long-term consequences of China’s rise, it
undertook a series of analyses of the country’s economy; military
capabilities and modernisation; potential economic and political
influence in the region and perception of the security environment.64
The ONA often conducted war games designed to assess how US and Chinese
forces might interact, including through the office’s annual summer
studies programme at the US Naval War College.During this period, many
other US organisations, especially ONArelated think tanks, worked to
assess China. Analytical tools developed by the office were often used
to simulate Sino-American conflicts.65 In recent years, the ONA has
organised many seminars and workshops on net assessment, competitive
strategies and case studies focusing on China, including a 2010
conference that produced the book Competitive Strategies for the 21st
Century: Theory, History, and Practice. Such developments suggest the
office has accepted the United States will enter into long-term
competition with China, and has made the application of Cold War
analytical and strategic methods central to its work. It is likely that
the ONA seeks to identify China’s strengths and weaknesses, how to best
use US power against Chinese vulnerabilities and the forms of
competition that most favour the United States. For example, if the
office judges that China fears containment, it may formulate strategies
to exploit this perception.* * *A study of the ONA’s work suggests
that the United States’ pivot towards Asia has been a gradual process.
Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, the office’s progressive shift
of focus from the Soviet Union to competition with China was based on
long-term assessments of the security environment and the development of
potential emerging powers. It also suggests that the Pentagon began a
detailed assessment of Chinese strengths and weaknesses in the early
2000s. In recent years, ONA studies have attempted to outline a strategy
to exploit Chinese vulnerabilities and compete in areas in which the
United States is strong, with the goal of preserving US primacy. If the
office’s work anticipates US strategy in Asia, the United States may
demonstrate its power in highly selective ways that aim to dissuade
China from challenging its dominance. It is likely that Cold War
competitive strategies will be a significant part of the Pentagon’s
approach to China in coming decades.Notes

随着中国的崛起和美国逐渐从中东事务中抽身退出,众多外交政策评论家接二连三的预言世界将回到大国争霸的格局上来。如果中美两国都不会像苏联那样轰然崩溃,那么它们能否和平共处以及如何和平共处就成了21世纪最重大的国际安全问题。如果华盛顿方面能恪守国家安全利益,则中美两国和平共处的可能性会很高。

The first one: NATO is on the track of
expanding eastwardly. In 2013, China’s president Xi put forward the idea
of “the silk road”. The road starts from China, progressing westwardly.
In the geostrategic area, Mackinder came up with the heartland theory.
Accordingly, it was the Heartland (where the continental masses of
Eurasia were concentrated) that served as the pivot of all the
geopolitical transformations of historical dimensions within the World
Island.

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For the foreseeable future, China will have enough on its plate in its
own backyard. Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and Australia all have
an interest in preventing Chinese dominance in Asia. America shares that
interest, but reaching a balance of power in East Asia does not
necessitate extensive security guarantees, nuclear umbrellas, and
bellicose rhetoric focused on containing China at every point.

Possible ways for China and NATO to
cooperate with each other

[责任编辑:诺方知远]

中国当仁不让地将自己看作东亚地区的头等强国。加入中国的各方面能力持续增长,它有可能会动用实力来塑造东亚地区形势使其朝着有利于自己的方向发展。广为人知的是,中共一向高度重视领土主权问题。中国很可能在台湾问题上打出外交、经济和政治的组合拳。

Common interests

本文首发于Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy杂志2013年6-7月刊,网址参见

如果未来的美国领导人认为台湾问题属于美国国家核心利益范畴,那么中美冲突将很难避免。然而,如果美国能够实事求是地看待将台湾——承认它不过是一个偏远的小岛,不会直接影响美国捍卫其国家安全的能力——那么中美两国至少可以避免在台湾问题上爆发冲突。而且即便两岸统一之后,中国也不会成为地区霸主,也不会获得向美洲投射硬实力的能力。统一的中国不会在短期内对夏威夷、墨西哥或秘鲁动用武力。

NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade in the name of humanitarian intervention, which brought great
harm to China and revealed NATO’s policy tendency that is to implement
power politics and hegemonism under the control of the United States
after the end of the Cold War. China closed its door to contact with
NATO.

两国的地理位置决定了美国几乎不可能入侵中国本土,同样,中国也几乎不可能入侵美国本土。与1914年或1939年的中欧地区相比,今天的太平洋要安全得多。当年有谁夺取并占领了中欧地区的一片关键领土,的确会引发其他方面的合理恐惧。当然,现今悲观论者担心的的并不是美国或中国大举入侵对方,而是担心中美两国会围绕着三处最可能爆发冲突的领域展开争夺,即南海、钓鱼岛和台湾地区。

作者系外交学院外交学专业(第二学士学位)学生

In Sten Rynning article, he wrote “In
terms of global NATO, France and Germany were in alignment in so far as
neither supported an extensive new range of consultation mechanisms to
manage global affairs, though France’s opposition had a grander
rationale than Germany’s. The two countries thus helped push NATO into
the position where nothing much happened.” So from this, we could draw a
conclusion that the European countries want the NATO to serve European
countries interests. But the US see NATO as a tool to realize is
national interests and want the European countries to bear more duties.

If future leaders decide that Taiwanese sovereignty is within the
purview of America’s strict national interest, then conflict will be
difficult to avoid. However, if (somewhat coldly) the United States
recognizes Taiwan for what it is—a small, distant island with no direct
impact on America’s ability to procure national security for itself—then
conflict, at least over Taiwan, can be avoided. Even the conquest of
Taiwan would not make China a regional hegemon, nor would it provide
China with the ability to project significant power into the Americas. A
reunified China is not going to exert military power in Hawaii, Mexico,
or Peru anytime soon.

The discords between the US and other
members of NATO are advantageous to China-European countries
development. President Trump has written sharply worded letters to the
leaders of several NATO allies — including Germany, Belgium, Norway and
Canada — taking them to task for spending too little on their own
defense. The NATO summit will open on July 10, 2018 at Brussel. Before
the summit, many activists marched through Brussel to protest president
upcoming visit.” Marchers hit Trump over his trade policies, demand for
more military spending from NATO countries, immigration policies and
decision to pull the U.S. out of the Paris climate deal.”

If policymakers overcome their myopic obsession with remaking the world
in America’s image, there is no reason to assume tensions must escalate
into full-blown military conflict. The choice between war and peace may
depend upon the prudence of foreign policy decisionmakers. If recent
history is any guide, this should provide little comfort. Here’s to
hoping the next generation exercises more restraint than the last.

ABSTRACT

在可预见的未来,中国的后院里有太多事情需要解决。日本、韩国、印度、越南和澳大利亚等国的利益都决定了它们有意阻挠中国在亚洲占据主导地位。这当然也符合美国的利益,但实现东亚均势并不一定需要美国提供大规模安全保障、核保护伞,也不需要时时刻刻发表遏制中国的好战言论。

Non-traditional security issues, such as
terrorism, energy security, climate change, are increasingly affecting
world peace and stability. In the process of development, China and NATO
need a stable and peaceful environment. Tackling the non-traditional
security issues by joint efforts is in the interest of both sides.

As China rises and America’s interventions in the Middle East fade away,
a stream of proclamations from the foreign policy commentariat has
announced a return to great power competition. Short of a Soviet-like
collapse, the most important international security question of the
twenty-first century will be whether and how the United States and China
might coexist in peace. The odds are good that they will if Washington
stays focused on its strict national security interests.

Key words: China NATO common interest

Some amount of insecurity between the most powerful actors in the
international system is inevitable. Intentions are inscrutable, and
states must often fear the worst in one another. However, the
inevitability of a security dilemma must not be conflated with the
inevitability of intense conflict or outright war. Even the most
hardened neorealists recognize that there is room for choice in how
states think about and procure security. International politics is not
mechanistic. Each potential flashpoint in the relationship is in East
Asia. This means that at each flashpoint, America will have the option
of backing down. The United States and China are on a path to tension,
but it is up to future administrations to responsibly manage those
tensions.

9/11 brought into sharp focus America’s
relationship with the alliance, magnifying existing fault lines and
cleavages and casing them in a new and more urgent light. In history and
at present, there always exist divergencies between the US and other
NATO’s members.

夹在伊肯伯里“制度乐观主义”和米尔斯海默“悲观主义”两种突出观点之间,另外一些学者的观点遭到了忽视——包括詹妮弗·林德,查尔斯·格拉泽和迈克尔·贝克利——他们提出了一系列敏锐的见解,综合起来形成了一种21世纪东亚局势理论框架,即便不能完全保障东亚地区平安无事,至少也可以将安全困境控制在和平的表象之下,防止其失控演变为毁灭性暴力冲突。

The US and European countries are still
haunted by the influence of financial crisis and debt crisis
respectively. The reality of fiscal austerity forces NATO to adopt
flexible policies. Since 2010, China has become the 2nd largest economy
in the world, so NATO could reduce its operation costs through
cooperation with China.

译:由冠群

After 13 years of war, NATO formally
ended its combat operations in Afghanistan on Sunday, leaving the Afghan
army and police in charge of security in a country plagued by continued
fighting, a ferocious insurgency and a rising tide of both military and
civilian casualties. China, as a neighboring country of Afghanistan and
Pakistan, has established an all-weather strategic partnership with
Pakistan. After the US-led NATO withdrawal, the NATO side hopes that
China could play a greater role to ensure stability in the region.

Pulling back from East Asia will also eliminate potential flashpoints
where conflict between the United States and China is most likely. As
Charles Glaser has pointed out, “[p]rotecting allies in Asia might
require the United States to engage in political skirmishes and military
competition that will strain its political relations with China.”

In the merger and acquisition field,
European countries also matters a lot. “It shows that China has bought
or invested in assets amounting to at least $318 billion over the past
10 years. The continent saw roughly 45 percent more China-related
activity than the U.S. during this period, in dollar terms, according to
available data.” In order to build up good relations with European
countries, China must handle the relations with NATO properly.

Perhaps counterintuitively, the best path to a regional balance of power
is withdrawal. Withdrawal would provide Asia’s “middle powers” with an
incentive to balance against China by increasing their military
capabilities, which may include the pursuit of nuclear capabilities.
Rather than ceding regional hegemony to China, retrenchment would
facilitate what Michael Beckley argues is an already emergent balance of
power in the region. China’s aggressive maritime claims and the
proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems to China’s
neighbors give reason to doubt that China will be capable of
establishing full control of either the South or East China Seas. The
middle powers can stop China from seizing such prerequisites for
regional hegemony.

Whether you like it or not, NATO plays an
important part in international strategic configuration. China is
working hard to build up new type of major power relations with the US
and comprehensive strategic partnership with European countries. NATO
belongs to the US and European countries. From this perspective, it is a
must for China to establish relations with NATO. In 1990s, China put
forward the “New Security Concept”. In simple terms, security is no
longer restricted to only military aspect but also encompassed
non‐military issues like economy, ideology, environment/society, and
science & technology. On September 28, 2015, Chinese President Xi spoke
for the first time at the United Nations Headquarters. He elaborated to
an international audience his concept of building a new model of
international relations based on cooperation for the benefit of all.
From the “New Security Concept” and “a new model of international
relations”, China’s willingness to be integrated into the international
security system is obviously expressed. NATO matters extensively in
international security cooperation. Thus, China could not bypass NATO in
the process of integrating itself into the international security
system. China and NATO have already made some progress in international
security cooperation. On Nov 25, the 21st task force of the PLA Navy had
a drill with NATO Combined Task Force (CTF) 508 in the Gulf of Aden. The
exercise included joint boarding and inspection on ships, replenishment
at sea and mutual helicopter landings.

Overlooked in the debate between Ikenberry’s institutional optimism and
Mearsheimer’s pessimism are other scholars—including Jennifer Lind,
Charles Glaser, and Michael Beckley—who have presented a series of
incisive arguments which, in combination, outline the basis for, if not
a fully tranquil twenty-first century East Asia, an East Asia where the
security dilemma will exist below the surface rather than bubble over
into destructive violence.

China-European countries relations